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Civil Rights in Canada: An American Perspective
INTRODUCTION
I would wager that far more Canadian lawyers have heard of
Brown v. Board ofEducation 1 than American lawyers have heard of
Regina v. Drybones.2 Yet, the latter case occupies as important a
place in the development of civil rights protections in Canada as
Brown does in ours, albeit for a variety of different reasons. More-
over, probably few American lawyers know that Canada adopted a
new Constitution in April 19823 that contains the following provi-
sions, among others: a guarantee to every individual of equal pro-
tection of the law without discrimination, particularly based on race,
national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or physi-
cal disability; explicit authorization for the creation of programs
designed to ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged individuals .
and groups, again with specific reference to those disadvantaged be-
cause of race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability (affirmative action, in other words); a
guarantee "equally to male and female persons" of the rights set out
elsewhere in the Constitution (an Equal Rights Amendment); and
an explicit grant to persons whose rights have been "infringed or de-
nied" to seek court redress.
In truth, even those American lawyers engaged in full-time civil
rights practices have rarely looked northward to discover how Ca-
nada was coping with its problems and, perhaps, gain some insights
that might prove useful in addressing our own. This parochialism
can be explained to a degree by the nature of legal education and
practice in the United States. Although almost all American law
schools provide courses in comparative law, such offerings are sel-
dom regarded as being within the "core" curriculum. Hence, few
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 9 D.L.R. 3d 473 (1970).
3. Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), ch. 11.
307
HeinOnline -- 32 Am. J. Comp. L. 308 1984
308 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW [Vol. 32
American lawyers develop a comparative perspective on the law. In
practice, consequently, neither lawyers nor judges feel comfortable
introducing foreign law principles or authorities into the resolution
of domestic disputes. And only recently have United States courts
begun to address with any regularity the impact of international
human rights law upon claims brought before them.4
Moreover, sensationalist media reporting in the United States
creates a negative impression of civil rights issues in Canada. Ca-
nada is that place, goes an all-too-familiar refrain, being "torn apart"
by bilingualism. As a result, government officials in the United
States responsible for enforcing bilingualism in voting or education,
as I was for four years, or lawyers representing Hispanic groups in
litigation, tend to view any reference to Canada's experience in that
regard as counterproductive.
Having said all this, however, it is still remarkable that Ameri-
can lawyers know so little about Canadian civil rights law. Our
countries, both federal systems, share a common legal heritage, a
host of social, economic and military interests and several thousand
miles of border. This article is an attempt, my having joined a few
years ago the small band of Americans focusing on such matters a
few years ago, to rectify this situation somewhat and to explain why
American civil rights lawyers and legal academics in the field are
likely to gain professionally from following Canadian legal develop-
ments in the years to come.
JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS PRIOR TO 1960
One of the first questions that should come to an American law-
yer's mind is how can it be that Canada, "the place being torn apart
by bilingualism," has addressed so straightforwardly in its funda-
mental document four issues that continue to bedevil civil rights
progress in the United States: rigorous constitutional protection
against discrimination on bases other than race and religion; affirm-
ative action; equal rights for women; and an explicit constitutional
right to redress for violations of its provisions? The short answer is
that these principles are the result of an almost forty year effort by
Canadian legislative, not judicial, institutions to provide meaningful
protections against discrimination.
Until April 1982, Canada's fundamental legal document was the
British North America Act of 1867 (BNA Act).5 The BNA Act was
4. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture); Fernandez v. Wil-
kinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (refugees)
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.C.D.C. 1981) (hostages).
5. British North America Acts, 1867-1976, 30 & 31 Vic., Ch. 3. (hereinafter cited as
BNA Act). The 1982 Constitution incorporates much of the BNA Acts and provides
them with new names. See Canada Act 1982, § 53.
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concerned with other things than civil rights, as we in the United
States would define them, although some Canadian scholars have
suggested that a "little bill of rights" can be drawn from a few of its
provisions.6 Rather, as a document enacted by the British Parlia-
ment to unite three colonies of British North America-the United
Province of Canada (which became Ontario and Quebec), New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia-it addressed principally how power
would be exercised within this new governmental structure. First
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy similar, but not identical,
to that in Great Britain was enshrined.7 Second, to the degree that
parliamentary supremacy was tempered in the Act, it was caused by
the provincial organization of Canada at the time, particularly the
existence of a French-speaking area later to be known as the prov-
ince of Quebec. Hence the Act made provision for the distribution
of power between the federal (central) government and the prov-
inces, setting out at great length what matters could be reached only
by the former and what by the latter.8 The distribution was sup-
posed to be exhaustive, that is, all governmental power was lodged
either in the Parliament or provincial legislatures, with residual
power residing in the central government, and mutually exclusive.
Consequently, concepts of implied power and overlapping jurisdic-
tion were foreign to the structure of the BNA Act. Contrast this ar-
rangement with our original constitutional scheme in which
principal focus was upon limiting the powers of the central govern-
ment, leaving to the States and the people, in vague and general
terms, those matters not explicitly delegated.9 The upshot of the
melding of parliamentary supremacy and federalism for Canada was
6. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 421-422 (1977) (hereinafter cited as
Bogg). For full discussions of the history and scope of the BNA Acts, see generally,
Bogg and Whyte & Lederman, Canadian Constitutional Law (1975) and Sabetti,
''The Historical Context of Constitutional Change in Canada," 45 L. & Contemp. ?rob.
11 (1982).
7. One authority describes parliamentary supremacy as follows:
In the United Kingdom there are no limits to legislative power: there is no
fundamental law which cannot be altered by ordinary parliamentary action;
there is no constituent instrument which allocates some subject matters of
legislation to the Parliament and denies others to it; and there is no bill of
rights which denies to the Parliament the power to destroy or curtail civil lib-
erties. Any law, upon any subject matter, no matter how outrageous is within
the Parliament's competence. It follows, of course, that the courts have no
power to deny the force of law to any statute enacted by the Parliament. Ju-
dicial review of legislation is unheard of in the United Kingdom.
Bogg at 197.
8. BNA Act, §§ 91 & 92. Sec. 91(7), for example, gives Parliament exclusive legis-
lative authority over "Militia, Military and Naval Service and Defence." On the other
hand, Sec. 92(12) leaves ''The Solemnization of Marriage in the Province" solely to
provincial regulation.
9. U.S. Const. Amends. IX and X.
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that each legislative body was supreme within its sphere-the Par-
liament in federal matters, provincial legislatures in theirs.
The Act was designed to accomplish two other objectives that
should strike Americans strangely, given our experience. First, it
protected, from federal or provincial encroachment, the existence of
governmentally supported religious ("denominational") schools. lO
Second, it ensured the use of both English and French in the
Houses of Parliament, in the Quebec legislature and in any "plead-
ing or process in or issuing from" the courts of Canada or Quebec.ll
In other words, the BNA Act was directed at establishing the rights
of religious and language groups against legislative change. One
final comment about the Act: it did not create a Supreme Court. In-
stead, in much the same way that Art. III of the United States Con-
. stitution leaves to Congress the decision whether to create courts
"inferior" to the Supreme COurt,12 the BNA Act states simply that,
"The Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this
Act, from time to time provide for the constitution, maintenance and
organization of a general court of appeal for Canada ..."13 A
Supreme Court of Canada was established in 1875 and other courts
have also been created subsequently pursuant to that provision.14
This structure did not offer much possibility for rigorous protec-
tion of civil rights, if one excludes as I do the questions of religious
schools and language rights. As one commentator observed, "the is-
sue is which jurisdiction should have power to work the injustice,
not whether the injustice should be prohibited completely."ls There
was, however, one line of attack against discriminatory provincial
legislation that offered some initial promise, the concept of ultra
vires. The argument was that the provinces were acting in areas
given over by the BNA Act to the exclusive jurisdiction of the fed-
eral government. This argument proved successful in an 1890 case
challenging a provincial enactment directing that "no Chinaman" be
employed in a coal mine. The law was held to encroach upon the
Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction over "naturalization and
aliens."16 Later cases found it harder to make such a clear distinc-
tion, upholding provincial legislation that held that "no Chinaman,
Japanese or Indian shall ... be entitled to vote at any election"17
and prohibiting any ''white woman or girl to reside or lodge in or to
10. BNA Act § 93.
11. BNA Act § 133.
12. U.S. Canst. Art. m. § 1.
13. BNA Act § 101.
14. Hogg at 121-125.
15. Hogg at 429, quoting Weiler, ''The Supreme Court and the Law of Federal-
ism," 23 U. Toronto L.J. 307, 343-44 (1973).
16. Union Colliery Co. of British Columbia v. Bryden, [1899) A.C. 580.
17. Cunningham v. Tomey Homma, (1903) A.C. 151.
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work in or. . to frequent any. . . business or amusement owned,
kept or managed by a Chinaman."18 Provincial legislation was also
attacked successfully as "criminal," a matter over which the federal
government has exclusive jurisdiction by the terms of the BNA Act.
The provinces, in contrast, were given exclusive jurisdiction over
"property and civil rights in the Provinces" which, despite the famil-
iar ring of "civil rights" to American ears, was designed to relate to
most civil, as opposed to criminal, disputes arising within the prov-
ince.19 But even this approach did not work to the challengers' ad-
vantage. For the courts held that the critical question was not
whether a provincial law had criminal sanctions but rather whether
its "pith and substance" was punishment of crime or was merely an-
cillary to the achievement of some other objective properly within
its jurisdiction. Since the BNA Act granted the provinces exclusive
jurisdiction over "generally all matters of a merely local or private
nature in the province," the ''pith and substance" approach left wide
latitude for upholding legislation containing even criminal
sanctions.2o
Common law doctrines were also invoked, with mixed results, to
challenge discriminatory practices. The common law duty imposed
upon innkeepers, common carriers and operators of monopolistic or
privileged businesses affected with the public interest to serve
everyone equally, unless there were some reasonable grounds for
refusing, proved of almost no help in attacking discrimination in
places of public accommodations. The courts narrowly construed
the innkeeper rule, leaving owners of theaters, restaurants and tav-
erns, and even motels to discriminate at will, against blacks in par-
ticular, on the basis of race. And the licensing of establishments
serving alcoholic beverages was not held, in and of itself, to render
them "affected with a public interest."21 This story should come as
18. Quong-Wing v. The King, 49 S.C.R. 440 (1914).
19. BNA Act § 92(13). Laskin, "An Inquiry into the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights," 37
Can. B. Rev. 77, 114-16 (1959). Rand, "Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism,"
Harvard Law School Occasional Pamphlet Number Two 19-20 (Holmes Lecture, 1960).
20. Bedard v. Dawson, (1923) S.C.R. 681. The distinctions drawn by the Canadian
Supreme Court bear a striking resemblance to those developed by the U.S. Supreme
Court to sort out permissible and impermissible state legislation affecting aliens.
E.g., De Canas v. Bica, 423 U.S. 909 (1976), (upholding a California statute prohibiting
employers from knowingly hiring illegal aliens.) The matter is further complicated
by the fact that, although Sec. 91 (27) gives the Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over
the criminal law, Sec. 92(15) gives the provinces power to impose "punishment of
fine, penalty or imprisonment for enforcing any law of the province made in relation
to any matter coming within any classes of subjects" otherwise within provincial ju-
risdiction. The provinces have been able to rely upon this provision to enact penal
laws which are "indistinguishable from certain federal criminal laws." Bogg at 277-78,
291-93.
21. See Christie v. The York Corporation, [1940) S.C.R. 139 (upholding tavern
owner's refusal to serve blacks). See generally, Scott, Civil Liberties and Canadian
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little surprise to students of American law with respect to discrimi-
nation in places of public accommodation. From the Civil Rights
Cases 22 in 1883 to passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,23 the issue
of whether proprietors could constitutionally refuse to serve other-
wise acceptable patrons on the basis of race and have that decision
enforced by police authorities was a matter of continuing debate.24
Only where there was a far closer nexus between the discrimination
and state power, as in the case of a privately-owned, segregated res-
taurant located in a government facility, did United States courts
find a constitutional violation.25 And very recent decisions have con-
cluded that liquor licenses do not convert otherwise private estab-
lishments into state entities for constitutional purposes.26
Application of common law doctrine in the area of restrictive
covenants, however, produced more favorable results. In one case, a
covenant which read: "Land not to be sold to Jews or persons of ob-
jectionable nationality" was struck down in 1945.27 Another cove-
nant, precluding any use or ownership of the land "by any person of
Jewish, Hebrew, Semitic, Negro or colored race or blood" was de-
clared void in 1951,28 While the former decision was based, in part,
upon the court's view that racially restrictive covenants were
against public policy, a position explicitly eschewed in the public ac-
commodations decisions, the latter took a narrower approach. It
concluded that there was no basis under the common law for ex-
tending judicial protection to covenants that restricted not the fu-
ture use of the property but rather the race or ethnic origin of future
owners or users.29 Nevertheless, the Canadian courts were able to
do something directly to end the use of restrictive covenants that
American courts accomplished only by indirection: restrictive cove-
nants could not be enforced by the latter only because to do so
would constitute state action in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3o
Two other judicial approaches deserve to be mentioned. The
Federalism 28-36 (1959); Schmeiser, Civil Liberties in Canada 262-77 (1964) and
Tarnopolsky, Discrimination and the Law in Canada 1-24 (1982).
22. 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq.
24. See, Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964). It was for this reason that the Pub-
lic Accommodations provision of the 1964 Act (Title II) was enacted based upon the
Commerce Power, as well as upon Sec. 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Supreme Court's decision upholding Title II's constitutionality relied solely upon the
Commerce Power. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
25. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
26. See for example, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
27. Re Drummond Wren, 4 D.L.R. 674 (1945).
28. Noble v. Wolf and Alley, [1951] S.C.R. 64.
29. See generally, Smout, "An Inquiry into the Law on Racial and Religious Re-
straints on Alienation," 30 Can. B. Rev. 863 (1952).
30. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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first has been referred to as the "implied bill of rights" theory.
Some decisions in the speech and religion areas, from the late 1930s
to as late as 1957, had contained suggestions that certain matters
were, contrary to the "exhaustive distribution" scheme of the BNA
Act, ultra vires the authority of both the provincial legislatures and
the Parliament to curtail. The basis for such a reading was essen-
tially that the BNA Act envisioned a parliamentary form of govern-
ment in which free and open discussion was central to its
effectiveness.31 In 1978, however, the Supreme Court of Canada ex-
plicitly rejected any notion of an implied bill of rights.32 The second
involves the principle of validity-that every official act must be jus-
tified by law. As under English law, ''with few exceptions, actions
which infringe the liberty of the subject require authority of a stat-
ute."33 This principle was invoked by the Supreme Court in the
1950s to halt a series of actions taken by the government of Quebec
to suppress the activities of Jehovah's Witnesses,34 very reminiscent
of similar actions in the United States during the 1940s.35
While these approaches served to limit somewhat the degree to
which the provinces could violate civil rights, no such brakes were
available to curtailfederal government abuses. One need only look
at Parliament's treatment of Japanese-Canadians after the bombing
of Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Most Americans are thoroughly
familiar with, and many ashamed of, the way in which our govern-
ment evacuated and interned Japanese-Americans during World
War n.36 In fact, a special committee created by the Congress has
just completed a set of recommendations, urging among other
things, the payment of reparations, for the personal indignities and
property loss suffered by Japanese-Americans during that period.37
Though it should provide little solace to Americans, Canada
seems to have dealt with its citizens and residents of Japanese de-
31. Reference re Alberta Statutes (The Alberta Press Case) 1928 S.C.R. 100;
Saumur v. City of Quebec, 4 D.L.R. 641 (1953); and Switzman v. Elbling, 1957 S.C.R.
285.
32. A.G. Canada v. Dupond, 84 D.L.R. 3d 420 (1978).
33. Hogg at 419.
34. Chaput v. Romain, 1 D.L.R. 2d 241 (1955); Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 16 D.L.R. 2d
689 (1959); and Lamb v. Benoit, 17 D.L.R. 2d 369 (1959). In Roncarelli, the then Pre-
mier of Quebec was found by the Supreme Court to have acted without legal author-
ity in ordering the cancellation of the liquor license of a Jehovah's Witness who had
been furnishing bail for other Witnesses charged with various offenses. For a full dis-
cussion of these cases, see Scott, supra n. 21 at 12-13,42-50.
35. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobi-
tis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); and Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 195 (1943).
36. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); and Rostow, "The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster," 54 Yale
L.J. 489 (1945). See also Irons, Justice at War (1983).
37. Personal Justice Denied, Report of Commission on Wartime Relocation and
Internment of Civilians, reported on in N. Y. Times, 25 Feb. 1983 at I, Col. 5.
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scent even more harshly during that same period, employing tech-
niques going far beyond internment to reduce their perceived threat
to national security.38 In early 1942, those living along the Pacific
Coast of Canada, in the province of British Columbia, were rounded
up by federal officials pursuant to the War Measures Act. Though
some were sent to work on beet farms in provinces farther to the
east, most were interned in camps located in the interior of British
Columbia. Their land, homes and other property were confiscated.
Gradually, those in British Columbia camps were allowed to
move east of the Canadian Rocky Mountains with the understand-
ing that any attempt to return to British Columbia would be se-
verely punished. Alternatively, Japanese Canadians who did not
want to relocate east of the Rockies were given an opportunity to be
"repatriated," returned to Japan once such action became possible.
Those who opted to move east were denied by Parliament the right
to vote in federal elections.
Even after the surrender of Japan in August 1945, the Canadian
government's mistreatment of Japanese citizens and residents did
not abate immediately. Those sixteen or older who had earlier
"opted" for repatriation were ordered deported, along with their
wives and children. Though this deportation program was upheld as
legal by the Canadian courts and on appeal to the British Privy
Council,39 the government ultimately terminated it in the face of
strong public opposition. But by the time the orders had been re-
scinded, almost 4,000 persons of Japanese origin had been deported.
It was not until 1948 that Japanese Canadians regained the right
to vote in federal elections and 1949 before they could return to the
Pacific Coast. Throughout this entire period, not one Japanese Ca-
nadian was even charged with espionage. This was as clear an ob-
ject lesson on the supremacy of Parliament within its sphere as can
be imagined.
THE GROWTH OF HUMAN RIGHTS AGENCIES
Given what one commentator called the Canadian courts' "nig_
gardly approach"40 under the common law to addressing discrimina-
tion, the question remained of what other institutions, if any, would
38. Much of the discussion with respect to Canada's treatment of its Japanese cit-
izens and residents is drawn from Schmeiser, supra n. 21 at 260-61; Adachi, The En-
emy That Never Was 199-354 (1976); and Berger, Fragile Freedoms 93-126 (1981).
39. Co-op Committee on Japanese Canadians v. A.G. Can., 1947 AC. 88. Until
1949, Supreme Court decisions and certain provincial court decisions could be re-
viewed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Supreme Court became
the final judicial authority in Canada thereafter in both provincial and federal cases.
Russell, The Supreme Court of Canada as a Bilingual and Bicultural Institution 25-38
(1969).
40. Schmeiser, supra n. 21 at 277.
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fill the void. As another remarked, "By 1940, it was clear that Cana-
dian courts regarded racial discrimination as neither immoral nor il-
legal."41 Surprisingly, given the earlier discriminatory practices
described above, the exclusive jurisdiction of provincial legislatures
was exercised beginning in the mid-1940s not to violate civil rights
but rather to afford them statutory protection.42
Undoubtedly motivated in significant part by the enormity of
the Holocaust and other Nazi injustices, Ontario passed the first
human rights statute during this period. The Ontario Racial Dis-
crimination Act declared, generally, that racial and religious dis-
crimination was contrary to public policy. More· specifically, it
prohibited the practice of posting "white only" signs in places of
public accommodations. In 1947, Saskatchewan enacted the first Bill
of Rights which extended protections beyond Ontario's prohibition
against racial and religious discrimination to include the proclama-
tion of certain political freedoms, such as of speech and of the press,
and the right to procedural safeguards in the criminal process. In
1951, Ontario expanded the scope of its human rights legislation by
enacting the first Fair Employment Practices Act and, in 1954, a Fair
Accommodations Practices Act.43 Despite their laudable objectives,
however, these statutes were only modestly effective for two basic
reasons. First, the entire enforcement responsibility was placed
upon the victims of discrimination. And second, enforcement was
by way of criminal process in the courts, with all the problems of
time, money and proof beyond a reasonable doubt associated with
that approach.44
Consequently, it was not until Ontario enacted its 1962 Human
Rights Code that the era of truly effective enforcement of provincial
human rights legislation began. That code consolidated all of Onta-
rio's human rights statutes and created an administrative body, the
Ontario Human Rights Commission, with the power and resources
to enforce its provisions. The Ontario approach, addressing substan-
tively discrimination in public accommodations, employment and
housing, and relying procedurally upon a Commission with broad
powers of enforcement, was adopted subsequently by every other
Canadian province.
While there are some minor differences among the provinces in
the organization and operation of their human rights commissions,
41. Hunter, ''The Origin, Development and Interpretation of Human Rights Legis-
lation," in MacDonald & Humphrey (eds.), The Practice of Freedom (1979).
42. See generally, for a history of the growth of human rights agencies, Hunter
supra n. 41; Tarnopolsky, supra n. 21 at 25-37; Tarnopolsky, ''The Control of Racial Dis-
crimination," in MacDonald & Humphrey (eds.), id. at 289-301.
43. Tarnopolsky, ''The Control of Racial Discrimination," id. at 296.
44. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights 69 (1975).
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the basic outlines do not differ markedly.45 Members of the commis-
sion are appointed by the provincial government. The staffs are civil
servants. Each commission has the power to investigate complaints
within its jurisdiction and to seek conciliation. Where conciliation
fails, the commission is authorized to order, when it deems appro-
priate, the convening of a "board of inquiry" to conduct what is, in
effect, an administrative proceeding. Unlike the United States
model, this administrative body is established ad hoc; its member-
ship is drawn from distinguished members of the bar and of law
school faculties for the purpose of hearing a particular dispute, not
to sit on, a continuing basis. Before the board of inquiry, the com-
mission has the burden of establishing "on the balance of probabili-
ties" (a civil standard) that the antidiscrimination laws have been
violated. Where a violation is found, the board may order a variety
of monetary and non-monetary remedies. An appeal of the board's
decision may be taken by the Commission or the charged party up
through provincial courts and, from there, even to the Supreme
Court of Canada.46 Noncompliance with board orders can result in
the imposition of penal sanctions or the granting of injunctive relief
by provincial courts.
American lawyers should find several features of this process
curious, given United States practices. First, the provinces (our
States), not the federal government, took the initiative in addressing
problems of discrimination. It would have been inconceivable, for
example, for blacks to look to the states of the Deep South in the
1940s and 1950s for protection against discrimination. In our coun-
try, federal legislation from 1957 to the present has been primarily
responsible for providing statutory safeguards against discrimina-
tion. Second, the political (the provincial cabinet officials and the
legislatures), not the judicial process, was responsible for establish-
ing that discrimination was contrary to public policy and should be
prohibited by law. The initial impetus for the civil rights movement
in the United States came from the COurtS.47 While the federal
courts played the major role in this process,48 on occasion even state
courts took the lead over their legislatures in addressing racial dis-
crimination.49 And third, effective enforcement of antidiscrimination
45. Hunter, supra n. 41 at 95-97; Tarnopolsky, "The Control of Racial Discrimina-
tion," supra n. 42 at 301-05.
46. The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that it has appellate jurisdiction over
human rights agency or board of inquiry decisions. Bell v. Ontario Human Rights
Commission, [1971J S.C.R. 756. See generally, Weiler, In the Last Resort 120-54 (1974).
47. See generally, Dorsen, Bender, Neuborne, Law, 2 Emerson, Haber and Dor-
sen's Political and Civil Rights in the United-States (1979).
48. Kluger, Simple Justice (1976).
49. Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (1952) (Delaware Supreme Court's affirmance
of lower court desegregation order which became one of the cases reviewed by the
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laws was secured in Canada by resort to the administrative process,
rather than to the courts by way of private rights of action. In the
United States, the Congress has consistently refused to give admin-
istrative agencies effective enforcement powers, such as "cease and
desist" authority enjoyed by non-civil rights regulatory bodies like
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC). Rather, they must, themselves, re-
sort to federal courts in order to obtain compliance with the law, as
in the case of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
(EEOC).5o What powers they do possess have, for a variety of rea-
sons, not been exercised rigorously or consistently.51 As a conse-
quence, our civil rights statutes have tended to grant an explicit
private right of court action and the courts have often construed cer-
tain statutes lacking such express authority to grant an "implied"
right of action.52
Ontario
While it is not possible in this context to provide an exhaustive
description of the scope and effectiveness of each provincial human
rights enforcement machinery, a look at the Ontario experience may
be instructive. The Ontario Human Rights Code of 1981,53 which be-
came effective on 15 June 1982, provides that every person has a
right to freedom from discrimination in the areas of (1) services,
goods and facilities, (2) the "occupany of accommodation" (rental
and sale of housing), (3) contracts, (4) employment and (5) mem-
bership in vocational associations and trade unions. The Code ap-
plies to private parties, corporations, other business and labor
organizations, municipalities and even the provincial government
itself. .
Discrimination is prohibited on a list of grounds that has no par-
allel, to my knowledge, in United States law. Included, for all pur-
poses, are race, ancestry, place of origin, color, ethnic origin,
citizenship, creed, sex, handicap, marital status (includes cohabita-
tion, widowhood, separation) and family status (parent-child rela-
tionship).54 Some limitations are imposed, however, with respect to
U.S. Supreme Court along with Brown). It is true, of course, that early leadership in
this area was displayed by legislatures in certain non-Southern jurisdictions. See
generally in this respect, Murray, States' Laws on Race and Color (1950).
50. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1974).
51. Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Block, "Enforcement of
Title VI Compliance Agreements by Third Party Beneficiaries," 18 Harv. Civ. Rights-
Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 1 (1983).
52. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
53. Ont. Stat. 1981 ch. 53. (Ontario Human Rights Code of 1981.) The Code was
significantly revised in 1981.
54. The Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms is the only provincial
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the remaining grounds. Age discrimination in employment covers
only those between 18 and 65; the age span is 18 years and over in
all other areas. One cannot be discriminated against in the area of
accommodation based upon the receipt of public assistance. And a
record of provincial or pardoned federal offenses cannot be a bar to
employment. More generally, the Act defines impermissible con-
duct as including direct discrimination, harrassment (sexual and
otherwise), indirect discrimination (acting through an agent), dis-
crimination because of association, constructive discrimination (dis-
parate effect), reprisals and discriminatory signs and notices. And
the Code excludes from its prohibitions special programs "designed
to relieve hardship or economic disadvantage or to assist disadvan-
taged persons or groups to achieve or attempt to achieve equal op-
portunity or that is likely to contribute to the elimination of the
infringement of rights" granted elsewhere in the legislation.55
Ontario's enforcement of the Code may parallel our efforts in
the United States perhaps more closely than that of any other prov-
ince because of its focus upon problems of racial discrimination.
Canada's relatively small black and other racial minority groups
have tended to settle in that province-successive waves of Ameri-
can blacks, blacks from the Caribbean, East Indian and Southeast
Asian immigrants constituting the major components of this popula-
tion.56 The work of the Commission reflects their presence. During
the entire existence of the Ontario Human Rights Commission,
complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of race and color
have constituted the largest single category on its docket. From 1974
to 1982, they have accounted for between 36 and 56 percent of the
workload. In 1981-82, 83 percent of the complaints to the Commis-
sion involved employment; 40 percent of that category had to do
with race or color.57 The second largest category of complaints has
involved allegations of sex and marital status discrimination, run-
ning from 23 to 37 percent between 1974 and 1982.58 While it is diffi-
cult to assess from afar the actual effectiveness of the Ontario
legislation that explicitly forbids discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.
Que. Rev. Stat. 1975 ch. 6 s. 10. Tarnopolsky, supra n. 21 at 324.
55. Ontario Human Rights Code, § 13(1).
56. For a comprehensive treatment of the emigration of blacks to Canada see
generally, Winks, The Blacks in Canada (1971). Winks writes, at 484, that as of 1970,
blacks in Canada had never constituted more than five percent of the population of
any province. A recent report done for the Metropolitan Toronto (Ontario) Govern-
ment notes that since 1967 Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidadtrobago and India have re-
placed European source countries in the five highest ranking immigrant groups
coming to that city in the 1970s. Asians, West Indians and Africans composed 59% of
the immigrant fiow to Toronto in 1976. Now Is Not Too Late (Task Force on Human
Relations Report to Council of Metropolitan Toronto) 37 (November 1977).
57. 1981-82 Annual Report, Ontario Human Rights Commission at 23, 55.
58. Id., 1980·81 Annual Report at 14.
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Commission, particularly in terms of how much more could have
been done than was accomplished in fact,59 it clearly appears to be
having a growing impact upon civil rights and liberties within the
province. In 1981-82 it achieved settlements involving cash pay-
ments, specific performance and affirmative action in several hun-
dred cases in the areas of employment, housing and public
accommodation, services and facilities.6o Boards of inquiry con-
vened pursuant to the Human Rights Code have also established an
impressive list of legal principles with respect to the nature of pro-
hibited discrimination and of remedial devices to correct for viola-
tions of the law. Many of these rulings have subsequently been
addressed explicitly by amendments to the Code or other provincial
legislation. For example, in 1970, a board concluded that derogatory
language by a plant foreman to a black employee might contravene
the Code's prohibition against discrimination with regard to any
term or condition of employment. "Term or condition of employ-
ment," the board chairman concluded, had to include within its defi-
nition consideration of the atmosphere in the workplace and
working conditions.61 In 1967, two female hospital aides alleged dis-
crimination on the grounds that they were doing the same work but
not being paid as much as male hospital attendants. The board,
agreeing that the Code required equal pay for equal work, ruled in
their favor and recommended that the employer revise its job classi-
fication and compensation structure entirely to reflect that princi-
ple.62 In 1973, a board awarded general damages (financial
compensation to alleviate the humiliation and indignity of the com-
plainant) in addition to an award for compensatory damages (out-of-
pocket expenses) to a woman denied housing on the basis of race.63
Since that time, general damages as high as $8,000 have been
awarded. In 1980, a board found the Liquor Board of Ontario, a gov-
ernmental agency, guilty of sex discrimination and ordered it to es-
tablish an affirmative action program to increase the employment of
women, in addition to providing the complainant with compensatory
and general damages and a letter of apology. The affirmative action
59. One researcher concluded, for example, that "only approximately one of
every ten individuals who suffers some degree of discrimination actually complains"
to the Ontario Human Rights Commission; Head, The Black Presence in the Canadian
Mosaic 74 (1975). See A Statement of Concerns and Recommendations Regarding
Human Rights in Ontario, Report to Government of Ontario by the Urban Alliance on
Race Relations (November 1980). On the other hand, complaints of race/color dis-
crimination decreased in 1982-83 from 42% in 1981-82 to only 27%. 1982-83 Annual Re-
port at 23.
60. Annual Report, supra n. 57 at 53-57. This trend continues. See 1982-83 Annual
Report at 29.
61. Simms v. Ford Motor Co., Annual Report, supra n. 57 at 13.
62. Byron et al v. Children's Psychiatric Research Institute, id. at 15.
63. Gabbidon v. Golas, id.
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program was to be coordinated with and monitored by another gov-
ernment agency charged with advancing employment opportunities
for women.64 And during the same year, a board adopted the Griggs
v. Duke Power65 effects test established by the U.S. Supreme Court,
to strike down a 5'10" height requirement imposed by the Ottawa
Police Department that systematically excluded most women from
being considered for employment.66
Federal
Following the lead of the provinces, and spurred particularly by
Canada's ratification in 1976 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the federal government decided to establish its own human
rights agency. The Canadian Human Rights Commission was cre-
ated by Parliament in July 1977 to carry out responsibilities very
similar to those discharged by provincial commissions. Its jurisdic-
tion is limited, however, to federal entities (departments, agencies
and corporations) to the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Cana-
dian Mounted Police and to businesses under federal jurisdiction,
such as banks, airlines, interprovincial railway companies, and
trucking and uranium mining companiesP What this means, as a
practical matter, is that the Canadian Human Rights Commission
has jurisdiction over only about 20% of the employers in the coun-
try; provincial jurisdiction reaches the remaining vast percentage of
employment situations.68
The Canadian Human Rights Act, amended most recently in
March 1983, parallels substantively most of the Ontario Code provi-
sions.69 Two provisions of the Act deserve special note, however.
The first prohibits the repeated communication of hate messages by
means of the telephone.7o In 1979, a board of inquiry (called a
Human Rights Tribunal under the Act) found that a group in To-
64. Hendry v. L.C.B.O., 1 Canadian Human Rights Reporter (C.H.R.R.) D/160
(1980).
65. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
66. Colfer v. Metro Toronto Bd. of Commissioners of Police, 1978-79 Annual Re-
port, Ontario Human Rights Commission at 25. A comprehensive listing of provincial
boards of inquiry decisions can be found in Tarnopolsky, supra n. 21 at 533-59.
67. The Commission did not become operational until 1 March 1978. For a gen-
eral discussion of the Commission, its history and enforcement experience pre-1979,
see Fairweather, "The Canadian Human Rights Commission," in The Practice oj Free-
dom, supra n. 41 at 309.
68. Id. at 310.
69. Can. Stat. 1980-81-82-83, ch. 143, §§ 1-2, 4-15, 19-25 (Canadian Human Rights
Act).
70. Canadian Human Rights Act, §§ 13(1)-(3). United States law, constrained by
the free speech guarantees of the First Amendment to the Constitution, prohibits the
broadcasting of only "obscene, indecent or profane language," F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foun-
dation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). And though the United States Supreme Court, upheld a
group libel statute in the 1950s, Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), there is
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ronto was operating a tape recorded message which could be
reached by telephone in violation of that provision. The message
proclaimed the supremacy of the white race and attacked Jews for
attempting to destroy the white race by means of Communism.
When the group refused to comply with the tribunal's order to dis-
continue the message, the Commission successfully sought judicial
contempt citations against it. The group's leader was sentenced to
one year in jail and the group was fined $5,000. The recording was
discontinued in 1980.71
The second goes beyond the reach of United States law to make
it a discriminatory practice for an employer to pay different wages to
males and females who are ''performing work of equal value."72
Federal law had required "equal pay for equal work" since about
1956. That approach proved ineffective, however, in reducing the
great gap between wages of men and women because of the narrow
interpretation given to the concept of "equal work." Jobs had to be
nearly identical before the principle could be invoked successfully.
The "equal pay for work of equal value" concept was developed by
the International Labor Organization in 1951 in the Rome Conven-
tion, to which Canada is a signatory.73
The Canadian provision does not purport to be designed to
equalize wages for men and women, irrespective of market factors,
overnight. Rather, it proceeds from the premise that the principle of
supply and demand has been distorted by stereotyped concepts of
male and female roles such that jobs that provide greater benefits
substantial question whether that decision still constitutes good law. See Gunther,
Constitutional Law 1329-40 (1980).
71. Canadian Human Rights Commission v. John Ross Taylor and the Western
Guard Party, 1981 Annual Report, Canadian Human Rights Commission. Canada's
experience with racist hate gsoups parallels that of thE~ United States. The Ku Klux
Klan began its first attempts to organize in Canada in Montreal in 1921. During the
1920s, though it operated in several provinces, the Klan's major base of operation was
British Columbia where it purported to fight "socialist-communist tendencies" of
Eastern European immigrant groups. After going into decline in the 1940s and 1950s,
the Klan reappeared in Canada in Ontario in 1965, claiming responsibility for cross-
burnings and desecration of churches in black communities. Since then it has oper-
ated off and on, forming an alliance with the Western Guard Party. In June 1980, af-
ter gaining support from United States Klan leaders, the Canadian Klan opened up
headquarters in Toronto. McAlpine, Report Arising Out oj The Activities oj the Ku
Klux Klan in British Columbia, submitted to J.H Heinrich, Minister of Labor for the
Province of British Columbia (30 April 1981).
72. Canadian Human Rights Act §§ 11(1)-(6). The degree to which this doctrine
may be invoked in the U.S. under federal employment discrimination law continues
to be a subject of vigorous debate. See County oj Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 .
(1981) and Note, "Equal Pay, Comparable Work and Job Evaluation," 90 Yale LJ. 657
(1981). A number of states, however, have enacted statutes that require equal pay for
"comparable work." See Gasaway, "Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther Overview."
69 Geo. L.J. 1123, 1147-49 (1981).
73. Canadian Human Rights Commission, Methodology and Principles jor Apply-
ing Section 11 ojthe Canadian Human Rights Act.
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than others have been undervalued because the former were held
principally by women, the latter by men. In order to counteract this
traditional distortion in the market, the Act requires that employers
engage in detailed and thorough job evaluation procedures, assess-
ing the value of the work performed in terms of skill, effort and re-
sponsibility required in performance of the work and conditions
under which the work is performed.74 A recent settlement demon-
strates that this new approach is achieving results. In 1980, 470 fed-
erallibrarians were brought into equal pay for work of equal value
with male historical researchers. The total amount of back pay
awarded to the librarians, 66% of whom were women, came to over
$2.3 million. Individual librarians received back pay of up to $5,900
each, and their salaries were raised by adjustments of $500 to
$2,500.75 '
To the extent that courts have been asked to review determina-
tions by provincial and federal human rights agencies, they have re-
sponded in ways that some observers believe have tended to curtail
the scope and reach of administrative efforts. Three cases have
been regarded as particularly troubling in this respect. In the first,
the Supreme Court of Canada construed a provision of the Ontario
Human Rights Code prohibiting housing discrimination in such a
way as to exclude from its coverage most lower cost urban dwell-
ings. Consequently, the very type of housing likely to be sought by
minority group members could, given the court's interpretation, be
denied to them on the grounds of race or other reasons prohibited
by the Code.76 The second case involved a complaint by a gay rights
group brought against a Vancouver newspaper under the British Co-
lumbia Human Rights Code for refusing to carry the group's adver-
tisement for a magazine which promoted homosexuality. The Code
prohibits discrimination in the provision orcthe denial of "any ac-
commodation, service or facility customarily available to the public
unless reasonable cause exists" for such action. The Supreme Court
of Canada held that the Code had not been violated.77 In the final
74. Equal Wages Guidelines, Can. Gaz. II SI/82-2 (13 Jan. 1982).
75. 1980 Annual Report, Canadian Human Rights Commission at 23. In 1982, a
major "equal pay for work of equal value" complaint was settled. Under the agree-
ment, more than 3,000 people received $17 million in back pay and a total annual sal-
ary increase of $12 million. 1982 Annual Report at 26-27. For background on the
earlier stages of this case involving the General Services Category of federal employ-
ees, see Tarnopolsky, supra n. 21 at 420.
, 76. Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Commission, supra, n. 46. the decision is criti-
cized in Weiler, supra, n. 46 at 139-43.
77. Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. The Vancouver Sun, 97 D.L.R. 3d 577 (1979).
For a critical discussion of the decision, see McPherson, "Developments in Constitu-
tional Law: The 1978-79 Term," in Belobaba & Gertner (eds.), The Supreme Court Law
Review Vol. I, 122-130 (1980). Another commentator, however, viewed the case as an
example of administrative agency overreaching. Hunter, supra, n. 41 at 84-90.
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case, the Supreme Court held that a government agency in the prov-
ince of Alberta lacked jurisdiction to establish an affirmative action
program to ensure that members of five Indian tribes received pref-
erential treatment in hiring and business opportunities on an oil ex-
ploration project.78 Though the provincial legislatures in Ontario
and Alberta amended their human rights statutes to overturn, in ef-
fect, the restrictive judicial interpretations on housing discrimina-
tion and affirmative action,79 the momentum of civil rights
enforcement was retarded, nevertheless.80
The Canadian Bill of Rights81
During the period of development of human rights machinery in
the provinces, federal legislators had not lost sight of the fact that
Canada's fundamental document was essentially silent on matters
of civil rights and civil liberties. Beginning in about 1945, a move-
ment to amend the British North America Act to correct this omis-
sion got underway. Because of the cumbersome procedure
associated with amending the Act, however, the most that could be
achieved by 1960 was the enactment of a federal statute, not a con-
stitutional amendment, applicable only to the central government.
The provinces, acting within their proper sphere, were not affected
at all by this legislation, the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960.82 It was
thought, however, that at least this much should be done as an in-
terim measure, pending the development of a greater consensus for
amending the British North America Act.83
In much the way that the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights84 is struc-
tured, the 1960 Act addresses itself to a list of freedoms which per-
78. Athabasca Tribal Council v. Amoco Canada Petroleum Co. Ltd., 124 D.L.R. 3d.
1 (1981) For an extended discussion of this case, see Tarnopolsky, ''The Equality
Rights" in Tarnopolsky & Beaudoin (eds.), Canadian Charter oj Rights and Freedoms
431-433 (1982).
79. Hunter, supra n. 41 at 92; Tarnopolsky, id. at 433.
80. There have been two recent Supreme Court decisions, however, that seem, at
least to an outsider, as generally supportive of human rights agency action. In Board
of Governors of Seneca College v. Bhaduria, 124 D.L.R. 3d 193 (1981), the Court de-
clined to recognize the new tort of racial discrimination, holding that the mechanism
established under the Ontario Human Rights Code was the complainant's only ave-
nue to redress. See Tarnopolsky, supra n. 21 at 482-85 for a discussion of this case in
detail. And Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Borough of Etobicoke, 132 D.L.R.
3d 14 (1982) upheld a board of inquiry's determination that the Borough's mandatory
retirement age of 60 for firefighters was not a bona fide occupational qualification
under the Ontario Human Rights Code.
81. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill oj Rights (197:5) is the definitive work on the
development and early application of the Bill of Rights.
82. Can Stat. 1960 ch. 44 (Can. Rev. Stat. 1970, Appendix III).
83. Id. at 11-14. See also Scott, "Dominion Jurisdiction Over Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms," 27 Can. B. Rev. 497-511 (1952) for a discussion of the
problems presented by any effort to amend the B.N.A. Act.
84. See text, supra at 12.
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sons in Canada have a right to enjoy without discrimination, such as
freedom of religion and speech.85 Though discrimination based
upon race, national origin, color, religion or sex is explicitly prohib-
ited by the Bill, it has been construed to reach discrimination on
other grounds, as well.86 The Canadian Bill of Rights also sets out a
number of procedural protections to be afforded persons involved in
legal proceedings, particularly those subject to criminal prosecu-
tion.87 Like human rights legislation in three provinces-including
Saskatchewan-the Bill of Rights contains what is generally re-
ferred to as a non obstante or override clause.88 It gives Parliament
the power to curtail or suspend the operation of certain provisions
of the Bill of Rights by enacting simple legislation explicitly to that
effect. Hence, a law found to violate freedom of speech would fall in
the face of the Bill of Rights unless Parliament made clear its inten-
tions to have the restrictive enactment operate irrespective of the
1960legislation.89 Given the supremacy of the Parliament within its
sphere under the British North America Act, the courts had some
difficulty discerning their role under the Bill of Rights. Were they
supposed to engage in judicial review of acts of Parliament, declar-
ing them illegal when they conflicted with guarantees under the Bill
of Rights, with the understanding that subsequent legislative action
would be able to override their decision? Was the Bill of Rights to
be viewed as merely another statute, subject to traditional narrow-
ing canons of construction, or was it intended to be a "quasi-consti-
tutional" document, entitled to be construed liberally to achieve its
underlying objectives?90
Largely because of this ambivalence, the courts tended gener-
ally to avoid reliance upon the Bill of Rights for the first ten years of
its existence. Where it did come into play, the courts found creative
ways of holding that the challenged law and the Bill of Rights were
not in conflict, as, for example, in a 1963 decision that the Lord's Day
Act (Canada's Sunday Closing Law) did not violate the Bill of
Rights guarantee of freedom of religion. The majority opinion for
the Supreme Court of Canada simply concluded that, since such
laws existed prior to the Bill of Rights' coming into force, Parliament
could not have viewed them as inconsistent with that latter stat-
85. Bill of Rights, § 1.
86. Regina v. Burnshine 1 S.C.R. 693 (1975) (discriminatory sentencing).
87. Bill of Rights, § 2.
88. Tarnopolsky, "A Full Overview of the Charter," The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms 108 (Continuing Legal Education Seminar, Ottawa, 29 May
1982).
89. Hogg, "A Comparison of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms with
the Canadian Bill of Rights," in Tarnopolsky & Beaudoin (eds.), supra n. 78 at 10-12.
90. Gold, "Equality Before the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada: A Case
Study," 18 Osgoode Hall L.J. 337-39 (1980).
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ute.91 This view of the relationship of the Bill of Rights to practices
considered legal prior to its adoption, often referred to as the "fro-
zen concepts" doctrine, became a major obstacle to any evolutionary
development of its provision.92
In 1969, however, the Supreme Court decision in Regina v.
Drybones93 appeared to herald a much more liberal application of
the Bill of Rights, giving it greater significance than that afforded a
simple statute. In Drybones, the Court was faced with the question
of whether provisions of the federal Indian Act violated rights guar-
anteed by the Bill of Rights to "equality before the law and protec-
tion of the law" without discrimination on the basis of race.
Drybones, an Indian, had been prosecuted for being intoxicated "off
a reserve" (Indian reservation) under a provision that had the effect
of making an Indian criminally liable for being drunk even in pri-
vate. Non-Indians in the Northwest Territory, an area subject to fed-
eral control where the case arose, could be prosecuted, in contrast,
only for public drunkenness. Penalties for intoxication under the
Indian Act were also different and harsher in certain respects than
those applicable to non-Indians. The Supreme Court concluded that
the Indian Act provision was contrary to the Bill's equality provi-
sion, and thereby, rendered "inoperative." According to the majority
opinion, the Bill of Rights was designed to prohibit laws making it
"an offense punishable at law on account of race, for a person to do
something which all Canadians who are not members of that race
may do with impunity."94 The Court also appeared to reject, at least
in this context, the "frozen concepts" doctrine, since the Indian Act
provision at issue had been in effect on 10 August 1960 when the Bill
of Rights became law.
The elevated status accorded the Bill of Rights in Drybones was
not to endure, however. During the 1970s the Supreme Court of Ca-
nada decided nine other cases interpreting the "equality before the
law and protection of the law" provision.95 All upheld statutes chal-
lenged as being repugnant to the Bill of Rights. Three of those
cases, in the areas of sex and race discrimination need special
mention.
In the 1973 Lavell 96 decision, two Indian women, alleging sex
91. Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen, 41 D.L.R. 2d 485 (1964). Note the sim-
ilarity between Robertson and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
92. Tarnopolsky, "The Historical and Constitutional Context of the Proposed Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," 44 L. & Contemp. Prob. 182-92 (1981).
93. 9 D.L.R. 3d 473 (1970).
94. Id. at 484. Brown v. Board of Education, supra n. 1 is cited by a concurring
Justice for the same proposition. Hall, J. at 486.
95. Baines, "Women, Human Rights and the Constitution," in Doerr & Carrier
(eds.), Women and the Constitution in Canada 41 (1981).
96. A.G. Can. v. Lavell Isaac v. Bedard, 38 D.L.R. 3d 481 (1974).
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discrimination, challenged under the Bill another provision of the
Indian Act that allowed Indian men, but not Indian women, to marry
non-Indians without losing tribal rights. Both women had been de-
clared by their tribes ineligible to live on reserve lands and partici-
pate in tribal affairs. The Supreme Court found that no denial of
equality before the law had taken place and rejected the women's
claims, despite what one dissenting Justice called the "excommuni-
cation of Indian women"97 effected by the challenged statute. The
Canadian Supreme Court, it should be noted, is not alone in finding
difficult the application of standard sex discrimination concepts to
controversies involving tribal Indians. In 1977, the U.S. Supreme
Court confronted a similar challenge under the Indian Bill of Rights
of 1968 and reached essentially the same result. Though the deci-
sion ultimately turned on the Court's conclusion that Congress had
not intended to grant jurisdiction to non-tribal courts to hear such
challenges, the majority's underlying arguments bear striking re-
semblance to those of the Canadian COurt.98
Yet another provision of the Indian Act, this one having to do
with the power of Indian women to administer the estates of their
spouses, survived attack under the Bill of Rights in the 1974 Ca-
nard99 case. It was contended that equality before the law was de-
nied because non-Indian women were automatically entitled to
administer their husband's estates, whereas Indian women could be
appointed only if the government official having authority over tribal
matters so decided. In both the former case alleging sex discrimina-
tion and the latter claiming racial discrimination, the Court dis-
cerned no conflict between its holdings there and the decision in
Drybones.
The final case, Bliss 100, decided in 1978, involved a challenge to
the federal Unemployment Insurance Act's pregnancy provisions. It
was alleged that the complainant, a pregnant woman, was discrimi-
nated against on the basis of sex and denied "equality before the
law" because she was refused, on the basis of her pregnancy, bene-
fits granted to non-pregnant workers. The Supreme Court of Ca-
nada, relying upon reasoning closely resembling that employed by
97. Id. at 509. The issue raised in Lavell became the subject of an application to
the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations pursuant to the Optional Proto-
col of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee held
that Canada's decision in the Lavell case violated the Covenant. Sandra Lovelace v.
Canada, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DR (XIII) (1981) (communication No. R. 6/24). On the
impact of Canada's international human rights obligations upon domestic law, see
generally, Claydon, ''The Application of International Human Rights Law by Cana-
dian Courts," 30 Buffalo L. Rev. 727 (1981).
98. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
99. A.G. Can. v. Canard, 52 D.L.R. 3d 548 (1975).
100. Bliss v. A.G. Canada, 92 D.L.R. 3d 417 (1978). For an extended discussion of
the issues raised in Bliss, see generally, Gold, supra, n. 90.
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our Supreme Court in similar contexts, concluded that the chal-
lenged scheme did not constitute sex discrimination: "Any inequal-
ity between the sexes in this area is not created by legislation but
by nature."IOI In other words, discrimination based upon pregnancy
was not sex discrimination. Moreover, no denial of equality before
the law occurred because the challenged law did not impose a
penalty on one group and not on another, as in the case of Drybones,
but rather withheld a benefit.
While each of these post- Drybones deeisions has its own intri-
cate rationale, at bottom all reflect the Court's uneasiness with its
role of judicial review under the Bill of Rights. Io2 The Court's
concern was undoubtedly heightened by the fact that the equal
protection challenges in Lavell and Canard threatened the compre-
hensive scheme for handling Indian matters on reserves established
by the Indian Act, a question not presented by Drybones .103 Ques-
tions that many had thought resolved by Drybones, such as whether
the Bill of Rights was "quasi-constitutional"104 or only a canon of
constructionI05 and as to the applicability of the "frozen concepts"
doctrine106 arose anew during the late 1970s. Instead of interpreting
101. Id. at 422. Another formulation used by a lower court judge in Bliss and
adopted by the Supreme Court majority was as follows:
If section 46 treats unemployed pregnant women differently from other un-
employed persons, be they male or female, it is, it seems to me, because they
are pregnant and not because they are women. 77 D.L.R. 3d 609,613 (1978).
The United States cases on this issue, which reach the same conclusion, are Geduldig
v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (constitutional) and General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976) (Title VII).
102. One commentator observed as follows:
Though Drybones established the principle that the Bill of Rights can be
used to render legislation inoperative, it did not usher in a golden age of Ca-
nadian jurisprudence. On the contrary, the Court appeared afraid of the im-
plications of its decision and the post-Drybones decade of litigation under the
Bill of Rights was characterized by a marked retrenchment on the part of the
Court.
Gold, supra, n. 90 at 353.
103. Eberts, ''The Rights of Women," in The Practice of Freedom, supra, n. 41 at
238. Cohen, Due Process of Law 33 (1977).
104. The Canadian Bill of Rights is a half-way house between a purely com-
mon law regime and a constitutional one; it may aptly be described as a
quasi-constitutional instrument.
Hogan v. The Queen, 2 S.C.R. 574, 597 (1975).
105. Compelling reasons ought to be advanced to justify the Court in this case
to employ a statutory (as contrasted with a constitutional) jurisdiction to
deny operative effect to a substantive measure duly enacted by Parliament
constitutionally competent to do so, and exercising its powers in accordance
with the tenets of responsible government, which underlie the discharge of
legislative authority under the British North America Act.
Curr v. The Queen, 1972 S.C.R. 889, 899 (describing Bill as creating statutory
jurisdiction) .
106. Regina v. Miller and Cockriell, 70 D.L.R. 3d 324 (1977) (mandatory death pen-
alty for murder held not to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under Bill of
rights since law predated the Bill's coming into force).
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the Bill of Rights in a way that would serve to check encroachments
on civil rights, the Court chose rather to perform a judicial function
very much like that demanded in federal-provincial ultra-vires
disputes, deferring to the plenary power of the Parliament in areas
within its competence. A law enacted by Parliament for a "valid
federal objective" was, by definition, viewed as consistent with
provisions of the Bill of Rights.107
THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
Efforts to amend the British North America Act to include a Bill
of Rights which began about 1945 bore fruit on 17 April 1982. On that
date, the new Canadian Constitution,IOB containing a Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (a bill of rights), went into force.
When originally submitted by the government of Prime Minister
Trudeau, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms envisioned a major
departure from the approach employed in the Canadian Bill of
Rights of 1960. Not only was the Charter to limit provincial, as well
as federal, legislative authority, it was also to provide protections be-
yond the power of the Parliament or the provincial legislatures to al-
ter, amend or repeal except by way of constitutional amendment. In
effect, the principle of parliamentary supremacy would be replaced
by that of judicial power to review and declare unconstitutional leg-
islation inconsistent with provisions of the Charter.IOg
107. Regina v. Burnshine, 44 D.L.R. 3d 584 (1974). "Legislation dealing with a par-
ticular class of people is valid if it is enacted for the purpose of achieving a valid fed-
eral objective." Prata v. Min. of Manpower and Immigration, 52 D.L.R. 3d 383, 387
(1976). Gold emphasizes that the Supreme Court's behavior in this regard can be un-
derstood only in the context of the Canadian legal culture, the definitive character of
which "is the central place occupied by the principle of the supremacy of Parlia-
ment." Supra n. 90 at 349. This principle has had the effect in Canada, as is true of
Great Britain, of creating a judiciary that views its role as more that of applying the
law rather than performing a lawmaking function, to use Prof. Atiyah's dichotomy.
Atiyah, "Lawyers and Rules: Some Anglo-American Comparisons," 37 Sw. L.J. 545-48
(1983).
108. Canada Act 1982, ch. 11. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms comprises §§ 1-
34. The Charter provides civil rights-civil liberties protections against governmental,
not private encroachments. See Sec. 32(1) and Hogg, Canada Act 1982 Annotated 75-
78 (1983). Provisional human rights provisions, insofar as they relate to purely pri-
vate conduct should not be affected by the Charter.
109. For a full discussion of the development of and debate over this earlier ver-
sion of the Constitution, see Milne, The New Canadian Constitution (1982); Reference
re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada, 125 D.L.R. 3d 1 (1982). See generally,
Wildsmith, "Canadian Constitutional Law, The Repatriation Reference and The Con-
stitutional Acts, 1867-1982: An Overview," in MacKay (ed.), The Canadian Charter of
Rights Law Practice Revolutionized (1982); and McWhinney, Canada and the Consti-
tution 1979-1982: Patriation and the Charter of Rights (1982). Ironically, perhaps, Ca-
nada's problems with bilingualism may have served to propel, rather than retard, the
enactment of the Charter. According to one leading commentator:
The major impetus in Canada for a constitutional Bill of Rights is concern for
Canadian unity when challenged by cultural dualism. One important reason
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The Charter's provisions are divided into eleven major catego-
ries. Three have a direct bearing on the question of racial and other
forms of discrimination. The first of these three occupies a category
all its own denominated "Equality Rights,"110 In essence, it guaran-
tees equal protection without discrimination, particularly on the ba-
sis of race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability, drawing heavily from similar protec-
tions in provincial and federal human rights legislation. But its lan-
guage can be understood only in light of the difficulties experienced
by the Supreme Court of Canada in interpreting the "equality
before the law and protection of the law" provision of the Canadian
Bill of Rights. l1l
The Court's conclusion in Lavell and Canard was that "equality
before the law" meant "equality of treatment in the enforcement
and application of the laws of Canada before the law enforcement
authorities and the ordinary Courts of the land,"1l2 not that the laws
themselves need treat Indian women and men equally or Indian and
non-Indian widows alike in matters of estate administration. The
Charter employs, therefore, the language "equal before and under
the law" to convey that the laws themselves must treat people non-
discriminatorily. The Court's dedsion in Bliss held that "equality
before the law" did not require that government benefits be granted
equally, only that penalties not be imposed discriminatorily. The
Charter's response is to guarantee "the right to the equal protection
and equal benefit of the law."
why Pierre Trudeau has always insisted on a new Bill of Rights has been his
commitment to guarantee language rights to all French Canadians and
thereby to defuse the threat of Quebecois nationalism. Weiler, "Of Judges
and Rights, or Should Canada Have a Constitutional Bill of Rights?" 60 Dal-
housie Rev. 205,207 (1980).
110. Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra n. 108 (hereinafter cited as Charter),
§ 15. Sec. 15 reads as follows:
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic or-
igin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
111. Hough, "Equality ProVisions in the Charter: Their Meaning and Interrelation·
ships with Federal and Provincial Human Rights Acts," in MacKay (ed.), The Cana-
.dian Charter of Rights Law Practice Revolutionized 319-22 (1982).
112. The Supreme Court of Canada adopted this definition based upon its reading
of the classic work on English constitutional law, Dicey, An Introduction to the Study
of the Law of the Constitution (10th ed. 1982). This interpretation of Dicey has been
severely criticized by Canadian scholars. See, for example, Tarnopolsky, supra n. 81
at 120-24, 295·300.
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Affirmative Action
Also included in the first category is a provision declaring that
the preceding "equal protection" guarantees are not meant to pre-
clude "any law, program or activity designed to ameliorate the con-
ditions of disadvantaged individuals and groups ..." In view of the
extent to which human rights legislation has also attempted to en-
courage affirmative action at both the provincial and federal levels,
this provision no longer looks so unusual.113 But it bears pointing
out that much readier acceptance in Canada of affirmative action
concepts than has been true in the United States is likely the result
of its history of addressing group, as well as individual, rights. The
British North American Act itself was concerned with the rights of
minority language and religous groupS.114 The Charter provides en-
hanced protections for such groups and directs, furthermore, that all
its provisions "be interpreted in a manner consistent with the pres-
ervation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadi-
ans."115 The composition of the Supreme Court of Canada, itself, is
affected by group considerations. By statute, at least three of its
nine members must be judges from either the courts or bar of Que-
bec, a requirement that ensures their competence in civil law and
fluency in French.116
Not only have these differences been recognized and
respected-they have formed the basis for programs designed spe-
cifically to improve the conditions of disadvantaged groups. In 1963,
for example, a federal commission report on the disproportionate
absence of Francophonic Canadians in the public service resulted in
what one commentator referred to as "the greatest affirmative action
program of all" to correct this underrepresentation. A number of
such programs to benefit Indians and women have subsequently
been approved at both the provincial and federallevels. 117
Interestingly, the response of the Supreme Court of Canada to
the concept of affirmative action has been positive, even though its
one decision to date on the issue, the Athabasca Tribal Council
case, held a preferential program for Indians without legal authority.
The Court rejected, however, arguments that such an affirmative ac-
tion plan would discriminate against non-Indians in violation of the
province's human rights legislation.Ha The affirmative action provi-
sion of the Charter is, therefore, less a response to an unfavorable
113. Eight provinces and the federal government have explicit affirmative action
provisions in their human rights laws. Tarnopolsky, supra n. 21 at 146.
114. BNA §§ 93 & 133. See discussion, supra n. 10.
115. Charter, § 27.
116. Russell, supra n. 39 at 59-69.
117. Tarnopolsky, supra n. 78 at 434.
118. Supra n. 78.
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judicial climate in Canada than an effort to avoid the controversy
that had arisen in the United States, in such cases as Bakke 119 and
Weber,120 over ''reverse discrimination."121
Sex Discrimination
The second provision relevant to this inquiry, in effect an Equal
Rights Amendment, declares that "notwithstanding anything in this
Charter, the rights and freedoms referrE~d to it are guaranteed
equally to male and female persons."122 This section of the Charter
was added to the original Trudeau Government proposal in April
1981 in response to criticisms that the "Equality Rights" provisions
were not sufficiently strong to ensure against judicial interpretations
unfavorable to the rights of women.123 As with respect to the matter
of racial discrimination, the Supreme Court of Canada's record on
women's rights issues has not been very good, even before its deci-
sions in Lavell and Bliss .124 In 1928, for example, it was confronted
with the question of whether women were "persons" under a provi-
sion of the British North America Act which allowed "qualified per-
sons" to serve in the Canadian Senate. The Court concluded they
were not, a decision that was subsequently overturned on appeal to
the British Privy Council.125 The Supreme Court's interpretation of
the word "persons," however, followed a long line of English and
lower Canadian court opinions barring women from voting, holding
public office or training for the professions.126
But two more recent considerations were at the heart of those
concerned abut the protection of women's :rights under the Charter.
First, the Supreme Court's deferential treatment of laws challenged
119. University of California Regents y. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
120. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
121. The question is once again before the U.S. Supreme Court in the current
term. Firefighters Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, No. 82-206, cert. granted, 103 Sup. Ct. 2451
(1983).
122. Charter, § 28. This "Equal Rights Amendment" provision became effective
immediately. In contrast, the "Equal Rights" provisions do not take effect until 1985.
Charter, § 32(2). It was thought that this three-year p4~riod was needed by the federal
and provincial governments to amend those statutes that appeared to violate Sec. 15.
See Hogg, "A Comparison of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the
Canadian Bill of Rights," in Tarnpolsky and Beaudoin, supra n. 78 at 20-21. During
this interim period, provincial human rights legislation, the Canadian Human Rights
Act and the Canadian Bill of Rights will remain in force. To the extent that inconsis-
tencies exist between those laws and the Charter, thereafter, the Charter will control.
Hogg, in Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin, supra n. 78 at 2-4.
123. Milne, supra n. 109 at 100.
124. See generally, Baines, supra n. 95 at 31-63.
125. Edwards v. A.G. Canada, [1930) A.C. 124.
126. Eberts, ''The Rights of Women," in The Practice of Freedom, supra n. 41 at
231-235. One provincial judge even cited the often criticized U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion upholding state denial of bar admission to women, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
130 (1873), to reach a similar result. Re Mabel French, 37 N.B. 359, 371 (1905).
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under the Bill of Rights raised fears that the same type of "mini-
mum scrutiny" would be invoked under the "Equality Rights" provi-
sions of the Charter.127 Second, even if the intricate efforts in the
drafting of the "Equality Rights" provisions to forestall judicial anal-
ysis like that in Lavell and Bliss proved successful, the courts might
nevertheless resort to a form of "intermediate scrutiny" adopted by
the U.S. Supreme Court in sex discrimination cases.128
Ironically perhaps, the provision ultimately included in the
Charter on the equal rights of males and females occupies a status
more favorable than that afforded other equality rights such as, for
example, the prohibition against racial discrimination. First, it is not
affected by a potentially limiting introductory provision of the Char-
ter that "guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demon-
strably justified in a free and democratic society."129 Since some
commentators have viewed this provision as incorporating the "valid
federal objective" test that proved fatal to the challenge in Bliss, its
inapplicability to the equal rights amendment provision may have
major positive consequences for future sex discrimination litigation.
Presumably the more general equality provisions are subject to the
"reasonable limits" mode of analysis.130
The second reason for the equal rights amendment provision's
unique status relates to one of the conditions provincial officials ex-
acted in November 1981 from the Trudeau Government in exchange
for their supporting the Charter. The provinces were able to effect
an amendment to the Charter giving their legislatures non obstante
power with respect to certain of its provisions. l31 The approved
clause, which came to include the Parliament as well, allows the leg-
islatures to override certain provisions of the Charter for a period of
five years by way of explicit legislative action. At the end of five
years, the overriden provision resumes effect unless a further over-
ride is enacted. The "equality of male and female" provision is not
subject to this override process, largely as a result of extremely ef-
fective lobbying by women's groups at the time of the compromise.
But the more general equality provisions having to do with discrimi-
127. "Women, Human Rights & The Constitution," submission of the Canadian Ad-
visory Council on the Status of Women to the Special Joint Committee on the Consti-
tution (18 November 1980) 2 CHRR C/35 (1981). Eberts, ''The Rights of Women," in
The Practice of Freedom, supra n. 41 at 235-36.
128. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Eberts, "Women and Constitutional Re-
newal," in Doerr & Carrier, supra, n. 95 at 9-13. Williams, "Sex Discrimination Under
the Charter: Some Problems of Theory," 4 CHRR C/83-1 (1983).
129. Charter, § 1. Tarnopolsky, supra, n. 78 at 436-37.
130. Marx, "Entrenchment, Limitations and Non-Obstante," in Tarnopolsky &
Beaudoin supra n. 78 at 61-70.
131. Milne, supra n. 109 at 149-55.
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nation on the basis of race and national or ethnic origin can be
overridden.132
Consequently, the special status afforded in the Charter to the
"equality of male and female" provision solves certain problems
with respect to treatment of sex discrimination but raises a host of
others.
Override
On the other hand, American lawyers should find it strange that
there is not general consternation in Canada over the inclusion, at
the "Eleventh Hour," of non obstante provisions in a document that
was originally designed to "entrench" civil rights and civil liberties
against legislative tampering. The central role judicial review has
played in our legal system since Marbury v. Madison,133 for all the
criticism it has received over the years,134 predisposes us to ques-
tion any scheme that would permit the overturning of constitutional
decisions by simple legislation.135
Canadian lawyers, in contrast, even those involved in civil rights
litigation or scholarship, tend to view the override provisions as be-
ing a positive feature of the Charter, at best, and tolerable, at
worst.136 The reasons for this curious response, by United States
standards, can be explained in several ways. First, many Canadian
132. Charter, § 33. There has also been some suggestion that the affirmative action
and equal rights provisions of the Charter may be in direct conflict. The prevailing
view, however, seems to be that, since the central purpose behind each was the ame-
lioration of conditions for women, they can be read consistently. Tarnopolsky, supra,
n. 78 at 436-37.
133.5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
134. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980); Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and
Human Rights (1982).
135. See for example the ongoing and heated debate over Congress' power to limit
federal court jurisdiction. Redish, Federal Courts 140-148 (1983). Since the new Con-
stitution does not explicitly "entrench" the Supreme Court, leaving it, arguably, sub-
ject to Parliamentary legislation, this concern is likely to be exacerbated. The only
references to the Supreme Court in the Canada Act 19112 relate to the mode by which
the Act may be amended. See §§ 41(d) and 42(d). Presumably, the substantive provi-
sion of the BNA Acts pertaining to the Court, incorporated by reference, would still
control. See supra n. 5 and n. 13. See also on this point, Hogg, supra n. 108 at 92-94.
136. For example, the General Counsel of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association
stated as follows with respect to the non obstante clause:
Our reaction is one of great relief. They did not emasculate the Charter.
The process is a rather ingenious marriage of a bill of rights and a parliamen-
tary democracy. The result is a strong charter with an escape valve for the
legislatures. The "notwithstanding" clause will be a red flag for opposition
parties in the press. That will make it politically difficult for a government to
override the Charter. Political difficulty is a reasonable safeguard for the
Charter.
Borovoy, quoted in Jeffrey, The Charter oj Rights and Freedoms and Its Effect on
Canadians at 14 (Library of Parliament, June 1982). Borovoy expressed similar sen-
timents to me in an interview I conducted on 28 July 1982 in Toronto. Hogg, in Tarno-
polsky and Beaudoin, supra n. 78 at 10-13.
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lawyers were uncomfortable in principle with the idea of shifting
power from the Parliament and provincial legislatures to the courts,
as anti-majoritarian and unlikely, in any event, to alter strongly held
public attitudes no matter what the courts decided.137 Second, as a
practical matter, Canada's experience with the protection of civil
rights and civil liberties has been, as this article has attempted to
recount, a story of judicial ineffectiveness and inhospitality. By
comparison, the political branches at both the federal and provincial
levels have, at least since the end of World War II, been actively en-
gaged in recognizing and providing protections for individual
rightS.138 And, finally where non obstante clauses have been in-
cluded in human rights legislation, such provisions have been rarely
exercised. The 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights and the human rights
laws of three provinces-Alberta, Quebec and Saskatchewan-all
contain non obstante provisions. Yet, Parliament has seen fit to in-
voke the non obstante provision of the Bill of Rights only once in
over 23 years. And the provincial legislatures have been similarly
sparing in their use of the override power. In at least one instance a
provincial attempt to exercise the override power was discontinued
in response to strong public opposition.139 What the Canadians
have done by including the non obstante concept in their Charter,
137. Tarnopolsky, Canada's preeminent authority on civil rights and civil liberties,
takes the same position with respect to the non obstante clause in the Charter as he
did toward a similar provision in the Bill of Rights. In 1975 he stated as follows:
Although I believe that the Supreme Court should be able to declare legisla-
tion inoperative if it is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, nevertheless I be-
lieve that Parliament, cognizant of the fact that in the opinion of the Supreme
Court a certain legislative measure is contrary to the Bill of Rights, should be
able to decide that the legislation should operate notwithstanding the Bill of
Rights. I do not believe that a Supreme Court, even with a written Bill of
Rights in the constitution, can ultimately stand in the way of a legislature de-
termined to take certain action. All I ask of the Supreme Court and of a writ-
ten Bill of Rights is that the legislature be conscious of the fact that an
impartial tribunal, whose role it is to interpret and apply the law, has ex-
pressed its opinion that certain action is contrary to the Bill of Rights. More-
over, many of the cases which involve values protected by a Bill of Rights
concern administrative, and not legislative, acts. Even in the United States, it
is not so much Acts of Congress or the state legislatures that have been held
invalid, as administrative actions taken pursuant to these Acts. Therefore, in
these cases the impediment of parlimentary sovereignty on judicial review is
not often at issue.
Quoted in Tarnopolsky, "A Full Overview of the Charter," supra n. 88 at 123. See also,
McWhinney, "The Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights-The Lessons of Compara-
tive Jurisprudence," 37 Can. B. Rev. 16 (1959); and Conklin, In Defence of Fundamen-
tal Rights 96-122 (1979). For a very interesting discussion of proposals to entrench
individual rights in Great Britain, see Fitzgerald, "An English Bill of Rights," 70 Geo.
L.J. 1229 (1982). For U.S. non obstante parallels, see Calabresi, A Common Law for
the Age of Statutes 18, n. 8 (1982).
138. McKay, "Judicial Process in the Supreme Court of Canada: The Patriation
Reference and its Implications for the Charter of Rights," 21 Osgoode Hall L.J. 55, 58-
60 (1983).
139. Tarnopolsky, supra n. 88 at 121-22. Marx, "Entrenchment, Limitations and
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quite simply, is decide to repose greater trust in their legislatures,
rather than in their courts, to protect individual rights.
More specifically, however, the fact that some equality rights are
subject to the ''reasonable limits" and the non obstante provisions
and others are not raises the question of whether such distinctions
dictate differential standards of review depending upon the type of
discrimination alleged. If the "equality of male and female" provi-
sion, given its unique status, dictates the application of a very high
level of scrutiny in sex discrimination cases, does that mean that
race discrimination claims are entitled to lesser protection? Fur-
thermore, the general "equality rights" provisions specifically list
race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability as examples of prohibited grounds for discrimina-
tion and acceptable grounds for affirmative action. Does that mean
that laws alleged to discriminate on those grounds will receive
stricter scrutiny than legislation challenged on grounds, such as sex-
ual orientation, not explicitly mentioned in the Charter? In other
words, will the Charter's structure in this respect necessitate some-
thing akin to the U.S. Supreme Court's several-tiered mode of con-
stitutional analysis: strict scrutiny for suspect classifications or
legislation affecting fundamental rights; intermediate scrutiny for
non-suspect but highly questionable classifications; and minimal
scrutiny for other social and economic legislation?l40
If current United States practice in this respect is consulted, one
would have to find that-with the exception of race, national and
ethnic origin, color and religion-the other prohibited grounds of
discrimination are not viewed as triggering strict scrutiny. And
there appears to be no inclination on the part of the Burger Court to
expand the list of suspect classifications or fundamental interests.141
There is some suggestion in Canadian Bill of Rights jurisprudence,
however, that while the legislation reached discrimination on other
than the grounds specifically listed, discrimination based on one of
the listed grounds, such as race, would be illegal "a fortiori."l42 In
any event, based upon the Court's Drybones decision and the ap-
proach taken by both federal and provincial human rights legisla-
tion, it is difficult to believe that classifications based upon race,
national or ethnic origin or color will be evaluated other than by the
strictest standards. Similarly, the protections provided for religious
Non-Obstante," in Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin, supra n. 78 at 70-74. Marx, "Human
Rights and Emergency Powers," in The Practice of FrE1edom, supra n. 41 at 447.
140. Gunther, supra, n. 70 at 670-75.
141. See, for example, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) where the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a Texas statute which denied Mexican illegal alien children
a free public education. The Court used an "intermediate scrutiny" approach to
reach its result.
142. Curr v. The Queen, 26 D.L.R. 3d 603, 611 (1972).
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freedom in the Charter itself, the 1960 Bill of Rights, the British
North America Act and in pre-1960 Supreme Court rulings all point
to requiring a high standard of justification for laws alleged to in-
fringe upon that right. It is in the areas of age and mental or physi-
cal disability that the "reasonable limits" provision will likely be
invoked to justify certain forms of discrimination, particularly in
employment.143
Sanctions
The final section of the Charter that must be addressed here re-
lates to the question of how Canadians will go about obtaining rem-
edies for violations of its provisions. That this is not simple, as
constitutions go, can be seen from our experience in the United
States. Chief Justice John Marshall asserted in 1803 that ''the very
essence of civil liberty" was, that for every vested legal right there
be a remedy.l44 But it was not until 1971 that the U.S. Supreme
Court found an "implied right of action" based upon the Constitu-
tion itself to remedy alleged violations by federal officials.145 And
the current Court has expressed a growing dissatisfaction with that
earlier decision, in any event,146
The Charter directs itself to this issue of remedy specifically by
providing that "anyone whose rights or freedoms . . . have been in-
fringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in
the circumstances."147 Directness however, does not necessarily an-
swer all the problems. Several questions remain.
First, the language of the remedial provision seems to suggest a
cutting back on current Canadian doctrines of standing. United
States law on standing recognizes the existence of both constitu-
tional ("case or controversy" requirements of Art. III) and pruden-
tial limitations, flowing from separation of powers considerations.
The Burger court has relied quite heavily on one or the other head
of this doctrine to limit federal court resolution of certain disputes,
particularly those brought by taxpayers,148
In Canada, however, standing is a matter within the courts' dis-
143. Human rights legislation in Canada generally includes "bona fide occupa-
tional qualification" (bfoq) exceptions with respect to discrimination on the basis of
disability and age in employment. Tarnopolsky, supra n. 21 at 225-27, 304-11.
144. Marbury v. Madison, supra n. 132 at 163.
145. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
146. Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct. 2362 (1983) (rejecting application of Bivens to
claim by soldier against his superior officer).
147. Charter, § 24(1). § 24(2), which addresses the question of exclusion of evi-
dence in criminal proceedings, is not within the scope of this paper.
148. See, for example, Valley Christian Forge College v. Americans United, 454
U.S. 464 (1982).
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cretion. The Supreme Court of Canada has tended to exercise its
discretion in favor of, rather than against, granting standing. Per-
haps, the most far-reaching case in this regard involved a suit
brought by a former provincial official and staunch anti-abortion ad-
vocate.149 He sought to challenge provisions of the Criminal Code
dealing with abortion on the grounds that they violated the "protec-
tion of life" guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Specifically, he at-
tacked those provisions of the Code that exempted from criminal
sanctions certain types of abortion. The Supreme Court granted
him standing. The Charter's emphasis upon granting relief to per-
sons whose rights "have been infringed" would appear to exclude,
however, plaintiffs with only a "genuine interest as a citizen in the
validity of the legislation,"150 like the anti-abortion advocate.
The same language poses another problem, for it does not make
clear whether one may seek a remedy for an anticipatory breach of
Charter provisions. Since it speaks of rights that "have been in-
fringed or denied," there is the suggestion that a breach must al-
ready have occurred. Earlier drafts of this provision, however, and
the general availability of declaratory relief against the government
in Canada suggest that remedies for impending infringements can
be sought.151
One last consideration has to do with whether injunctive relief
will be considered by the courts as a remedy "appropriate and just
in the circumstances" of some disputes. There are at least two diffi-
culties in this respect. The first is that, in the absence of statute, in-
junctions are not available against federal or provincial
governments. But it appears that injunctions may, under certain cir-
149. Min. of Justice (Can.) v. Borowski, 130 D.L.R. 3d 588 (1982).
150.... [Tlo establish status as a plaintiff in a suit seeking a declaration that
legislation is invalid, if there is a serious issue as to its invalidity, a person
need only to show that he is affected by it directly or that he has a genuine
interest as a citizen in the validity of the legislation and that there is no other
reasonable and effective manner in wluch the issue may be brought before
the Court.
Id., at 606. On the other hand, it may well be that another part of the Canada Act will
allow broader standing in declaratory judgment cases. Sec. 52(1) declares the Consti-
tution of Canada- ''the supreme law of Canada" and any law inconsistent with it "of
no force and effect." This section could be read to allow a Borowski plaintiff to seek a
declaration of unconstitutionality. If he or she wanted other forms of relief, however,
the requirements of § 24(1) would have to be met. See generally, Gibson, "Enforce-
ment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Sec. 24)," in Tarnopolsky and
Beaudoin, supra n. 78 at 493-97; and Beckton, ''The Future Impact of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms on the Canadian Legal Profession," in Law Practice Revolution-
ized, supra n. 109 at 135-38.
151. Gibson, supra n. 78 at 498-500; Ewaschuk, ''The Charter of Rights, An Over-
view and Remedies," in Continuing Legal Education Seminar, supra n. 88 at 63-70.
Manning, Rights, Freedoms and the Courts 466-81 (1983). See Quebec Association of
Protestant School Boards v. A.G. Quebec, 140 D.L.R. 3:1 (3d) (1982) for an early, yet
thoughtful, opinion holding declaratory relief available under § 24(1) of the Charter.
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cumstances, be granted against government officials.152 This may, as
a practical matter, constitute adequate relief. More problematic,
however, is the reluctance of Canadian courts to grant mandatory,
as opposed to prohibitory, injunctions.153 Our success in the United
States in dealing with racial discrimination has depended quite
heavily on the ability of federal courts to grant such relief.154
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing has established, I hope, the history of civil
rights in Canada has turned very much on the inability or unwilling-
ness of its courts to act vigorously on behalf of individual liberties.
Each step along the way-the development of provincial and federal
human rights laws, the 1960 Bill of Rights and now the Charter-has
represented an effort to strike a proper balance between the princi-
ples of legislative supremacy and judicial review. Let us hope that
Canada has found the right formula at last.
152. Declaratory relief appears to be the preferred remedy sought against public
officials, rather than an injunction. Ewaschuk, supra n. 137 at 75-76; Hogg, Liability of
the Crown 18-28 (1971); Hanbury & Maudsley, Modern Equity 88 (11th ed. 1981). The
rule that allows Canadians to obtain injunctive relief against government officials but
not against the Crown closely parallels United States Eleventh Amendment Doctrine:
The states are immune to such suits in federal court but their officers are not, in gen-
eral. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
153. Hanbury, id. at 722-724.
154. Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction (1978).
